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Abstract 
This paper is about Fair Trade and business ethics. It analyses data from 
fieldwork conducted in a famous Darjeeling tea plantation which 
practices biological and biodynamic farming and is labeled as Fair Trade. 
Its aim is to show how the plantation owner, using aggressive marketing 
of his engagement with eco-friendly and corporately-responsible 
management, has managed to regenerate an old patronage system more 
or less similar to industrial paternalism, but with its roots in colonial as 
well as indigenous domination structures. Disappointed by their unions, 
workers have had no alternative but to accept this form of governance, 
and some even acknowledge it as a good one. This case is a good example 
of how Fair Trade, which claims to empower workers, can be used to fuel 
a system which results in their disempowerment as social actors. 
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Introduction 
Numerous authors have stressed the contradictions that revolve around 
the concept of Fair Trade, because it is a network of producers, NGOs and 
suppliers trying to establish what they view as a fairer commercial 
system while using the globalized market economy to do so (Cary 2004; 
Diaz-Pedregal 2007).1 This double bind has sometimes been regarded as 
a “dance with the devil” (Jaffee 2007). Daniel Jaffee denounces the fact 
that this system of exchange, normally reserved for petty producers, has 
now been transposed to plantation work, thanks to the labeling 
organizations,2 which are attempting to protect not just the small peasant, 
but now a waged workforce (ibid.). For example, according to Paul 
Luetchford (2007), who studied the Fair Trade impact on petty coffee 
producers in Costa Rica, the results seem rather positive overall, despite 
some issues related, for example, to the employment of seasonal wage 
laborers. The problematic fact of translating this kind of system to a 
waged workforce is that the notion of Fair Trade, born around the 1940s, 
once relied heavily on international solidarity networks created by 
Christian activists, often Mennonites (Jaffee 2007) or Marxists (Diaz-
Pedregal 2007), because its main idea was to introduce fairer 
relationships between the small producers from the South and consumers 
from the North by establishing direct contact between them. Of course, 
the intermediaries were seen as the source of the oppressive nature of the 
relationship. After the creation of Max Havelaar, the first labeling 
organization, in 1988, two opposite visions emerged: one, sometimes 
called the “revolutionary” vision, which wanted to rely only on the “old” 
small activist networks; and the second, the “reformist” vision, which 
wanted to generalize the selling of Fair Trade Products through the 
labeling system, albeit in supermarkets (Diaz-Pedregal 2007). It is the 
reformist vision which seeks to transfer the Fair Trade system to waged 
work. More broadly, Gavin Fridell (2010) argues that the Fair Trade 
network is indeed compatible with neoliberal institutions and that, to 
empower southern farmers, it has to set its actions within State policies 
instead of implementing programs that seek to replace the state welfare 
policies, thereby becoming an alibi for neoliberal institutions’ claim for 
economic deregulation.3 
                                                        
1 This article is based on a talk that was mainly a presentation of a book chapter 
on entrepreneurial ethics (Kaba 2015) and is largely inspired by this publication 
in French.  
2 Before the rise of these labels, the fair trade associations used to buy directly 
from petty producers with whom they had a direct link (Cary 2004). Creating 
labels allows suppliers to obtain products from any producer and so makes the 
product’s origins harder to discover. Moreover, the evaluation of the “fairness” 
practiced by the producer’s management remains at the labeling organization’s 
discretion. 
3 The fieldwork used as the basis for this paper was conducted in a Fairtrade 
Darjeeling tea plantation, broadly during 6 months, from 2009 to 2010. I was 
home staying in the plantation as a tourist, and I conducted my research with the 
planter’s authorization but also under his observation. 
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The analysis presented in this article is polemical in two senses: 
first, because I discuss a fair trade tea plantation that makes use of an 
agricultural workforce, and because socio-economic and anthropological 
studies of tea plantations hitherto have viewed them as a neocolonial 
(Chatterjee 2001), or even imperialist (Chausuri 1995), exploitation 
system; and second, because I studied a plantation labeled by the Fair 
Trade Labelling Organization (FLO)4 which has been criticized by Daniel 
Jaffee (2007) and Paul Cary (2004) for its ambiguous position regarding 
the modes of distribution (for example, the choice to supply 
supermarkets, and even Starbucks). In this sense, therefore, this 
particular plantation is a company practicing a “merchandizing of ethics” 
(Gallenga 2013). It sells partly ethical goods, because the consumer who 
buys its products thinks s/he is making an ethical gesture that justifies 
the price.  
According to Sarah Besky, an American anthropologist who has 
already conducted fieldwork in this plantation, the social situation there, 
though not bad, mainly consists in appliance of the law (with some corner 
cuts) but, more importantly, the democratic bodies meant to defend a 
worker’s rights are indeed controlled by the planter, and are in a sense 
eroding the power of the unions which are responsible for the law’s 
appliance (Besky 2008). In these respects, Fair Trade could be seen as a 
neoliberal alibi allowing the planter to sell directly to importers, while 
also shortcutting the legal framework by being certified as having “fair” 
labor practices without having to deal with the State labor institutions 
(Besky 2010)―an analysis that confirms Fridell’s hypothesis (2010). 
Given what has already been said, I will not here focus so much on 
Fair Trade certification issues as such, but analyze the way 
entrepreneurial ethics5 contained in the company’s marketing discourse 
copes with its actual management practices and ethics. In this regard, the 
company presented in this paper presents a sharp contradiction between 
the marketing discourses aimed at consumers and suppliers, which 
emphasizes ecological and socially-responsible management of the 
company, on the one hand, versus its actual management system, which 
in many aspects looks like a patronage system, on the other. This does not 
mean that the planter is avoiding all his social responsibilities: he is 
indeed redistributing some part of his capital in the form of social 
advantages to his workers; but the mode of distribution and the ethics 
behind it are very different. This mode of distribution looks like a kind of 
paternalism that reflects pre-industrial relationships, but which still has 
extensive influence in almost every hierarchical relationship in South 
Asia. Specifically, it involves a patronage system, or a set of relationships 
                                                        
4 The Fair Trade Labeling Organization is an NGO putting together, in a single 
network, twenty labeling organizations such as Trans Fair USA and Max 
Havelaar.  
5 “Entrepreneurial ethics” is a complex and contradictory concept which can fit 
many senses (Gallenga 2013). In this article, I use it in the strict sense of a set of 
values meant to guide a company’s management.  
                                                    Kabai / Of Old and New Business Ethics 
 
23 
based on protection against services.  
Thus, a number of questions arise. How does the company produce 
a discourse based on corporate social responsibilities, at the same time as 
being based on worker’s empowerment, so as to satisfy its clients 
(suppliers, customers, labeling organizations)? How can the planter 
implement social benefits that are, indeed, inferior to those mandated by 
Indian law; and are any claims made against him by his workers as a 
result? What kinds of social movements have been generated by this 
situation? Did the planter use the social benefits claimed and obtained by 
the unions to establish a paternalism structured by the kind of clientelist 
system that is so typical of that found in South Asia between dominants 
and subordinates? 
In the first part of this article, I will explain how the planter 
develops a discourse that conforms to the ethical model conveyed by the 
labeling organizations, and will show how it interacts with the actual 
governance of the plantation. I then discuss breaches in the company’s 
social responsibilities, especially in regard to the Indian law and worker’s 
demands. I will show that it is indeed the workers, through their unions, 
who have brought about most of the social advances in the plantation’s 
management, but that the trade union movement finally declined because 
of the planter’s authority, as well as internal tensions. In the last part, I 
will show how the planter regained monopolistic control over social 
issues in the plantation by using an external discourse, which enabled him 
in a more coercive way to consolidate a traditional clientelist system that 
had formerly existed in this and other plantations. 
 
A cooperative in the marketing discourse: centralized and 
authoritarian governance 
The plantation discussed in this article is situated in the Darjeeling 
district (West Bengal, India). The domain, more than 500 hectares in size, 
includes, aside from the tea bushes, numerous spaces covered with 
forests, and seven villages, inhabited by more than 2000 people. Many of 
them work inside the plantation, although this is not an absolute rule 
because the plantation cannot absorb everyone in its workforce and 
because educated young people tend to migrate out to seek better 
employment elsewhere. Almost all the workers are of Nepalese origin, as 
is a huge majority of the population as a whole in the Darjeeling district. 
Surrounded on its eastern side by the Nepalese and Chinese borders, this 
district has been populated by migrant workers and soldiers brought here 
by the British. They are is commonly identified  as “Gurkha,” an old name 
for Nepalese people coming from the eighteenth century Nepalese 
empire, and staking a claim for a separate State, the Gurkhaland, for 
almost a century now (Samantha 2000). 
The plantation practices biodynamic agriculture and is certified by 
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“Demeter.”6 It is also certified as a Fair Trade plantation and offers eco-
tourist homestays. One of its unique features is that a single planter owns 
the land, since nowadays, in many plantations, the planter is only the 
plantation’s manager, while the land is often owned by private funds and 
companies. It is thus not necessary for the planter to have an intimate link 
to the soil he is managing: he is ultimately a boss, appointed by the 
merchants. In this case, however, the plantation is family owned, 
perpetuating a father/son transmission model: the plantation was one of 
the first to be managed by Indians in the Darjeeling district, back in 1859. 
Since that time, the owners of the plantation have been born on this very 
soil―a fact which, unsurprisingly, the planter refers to when advertising 
his “terroir” on his website,7 alongside an ecological discourse based on 
his desire to regenerate the soil. The rhetoric of terroir, however, is not a 
particularity of this plantation: following the steps of the Cognac 
producers, the planter is an amateur in marketing the quality of his 
plantation’s soil in order to sell his tea as a high-priced luxury good 
(Besky 2010). 
The last heir of his lineage (his sons are not interested in the tea 
business), the owner has perpetuated the pioneering initiatives of his 
forebears, being the first plantation in Darjeeling district to convert to 
biological farming, a conversion that was not especially costly, as the 
amount of pesticides used in the Darjeeling plantations had never been 
high (Besky 2008). Furthermore, the choice to engage in biodynamic 
farming makes his plantation a rather unique case, even in a context 
where biological farming is becoming more and more successful (Besky 
2010). The planter’s marketing discourse advantage makes the most of 
these choices on a well-furnished internet site presenting numerous 
articles on the presumed originality of his ecological project, which he 
claims to have imagined after a mystical revelation following a fall from a 
horse. The plantation also markets its ethical side, presenting the 
workers’ rights provided and the overall wish to help their 
empowerment―especially those of women. The planter presents his 
management plan in a holistic view of the plantation that deals with 
ecological, economic and social challenges.  
His tea is also marketed, of course, with an argument for its quality: 
some years ago, it was the most expensive tea in India, and was therefore 
considered the best. There is also an autobiographical book written by the 
planter about his tea estate and the way he manages it, together with two 
documentaries and some advertising material given to visitors by the 
staff. However, the main way that the tea is marketed is through direct 
contact with importers, who are the main intermediaries between the 
planter and retail outlets, both in India and in the rest of the world. This is 
a specificity of the Fair Trade system, since otherwise the planter would 
                                                        
6 An organization certifying biodynamic exploitations. 
7 As this paper in anonymized, I cannot give the references of the internet site or 
of any advertising documents from the company. 
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have to sell his tea by way of a broker and the tea auction system in 
Kolkata, which acts as a financial center for tea exchange.  There I saw 
him negotiating with Indian and European importers. He also hosts them, 
visits the plantation with them, and tries to weave personal ties with 
them. He is, for example, a close friend of his main French importer and 
knows well another smaller French importer, who also made a 
documentary about the plantation with another friend. So the tea’s 
marketing is here based principally on personal relationships, and the 
marketing discourse somehow merges with the personality and charisma 
of the planter, who is by reputation a great story-teller. This very personal 
marketing was, so far as I understood, the main means by which he 
managed to present his holistic management model as a community-
based model and as a unique development project. This is a vision which 
copes well with the way Fair Trade is often perceived by its actors: a 
(relatively) direct, ethical (in the sense that the money is “fairly” 
redistributed to the producers), ecological, and community (often 
cooperative)-based economic exchange (Jaffee 2008; Cary 2004).  
Therefore even without looking at the actual plantation’s management, 
one can see a sharp contradiction between the discourse itself 
(emphasizing the community) and the method used to spread it (a very 
personalized one). 
Like the tourists and the importers, I was also in contact with this 
discourse during my numerous encounters with the planter. And I have to 
admit that the latter did a very good job in advertising his plantation― so 
well, indeed, that his French importer friend told me once that he seemed 
to have a magical power in the way that he charmed people. During my 
stay there, I was part of a tourist program normally conducted by the 
plantation (consisting of volunteering to do schooling, agricultural, or 
medical work), but as long as I was paying for my stay, I was tolerated as 
a “tourist researcher.” I did participant observation and worked in the tea 
processing factory, where the workforce is generally composed of men, 
and in the tea field, where women are in the majority. This rule is 
common to all tea plantations (Chatterjee 2001; Bhowmick 1984). I also 
observed workers’ daily and family lives. My data also include informal 
discussions, as well as formal interviews and narratives, conducted with 
unionists, regular workers, and politicians. As I was not a Nepali speaker, 
I was dependent on an informant’s network, and, during the second year 
of fieldwork, on a translator who had to put up with some pressure from 
the planter who, after having read quite displeasing articles about his 
management, was wary of young researchers interviewing union 
members. 
The fieldwork conducted on this plantation revealed that although 
the planter sought to present it as a cooperative, the organization of labor 
had much the same hierarchical, postcolonial structure of any other 
plantation. There are four grades of foremen (the higher the grade, the 
more workers and lower foremen one can supervise), then division 
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directors (the factory is then considered as a division), a general director, 
and a planter. This is exactly the pyramidal structure of every tea estate 
since the colonial times (Bhowmick 1984; Chatterjee 2001; Sharma 2000, 
2005). There, the foreman’s authority is far from being absolute. On many 
occasions I have seen women workers answering back to their 
forewoman. Thus discipline is by no means Spartan: in the fields, women 
negotiate sharply over their break, while in the factory, men often show 
up for work half an hour late and take a lot of informal breaks. However, 
these kinds of informal daily resistance are common in India and do not 
indicate an absence of exploitation (De Neve 2005). The harsh work, 
especially in the fields, leaves no doubt about this. Furthermore, although 
the employees are from the formal sector, there is nothing like the 
“shirking” ambience that Parry observed in the steel complex of Bhilai 
(Parry 1999). It is also important to note that my fieldwork was 
conducted during spring, when production is low and there is not much 
tea to pluck or process. According to my informants, coercion for 
extended and quicker work was far greater during the high season in 
summer (from June onwards). During that period, there is a lot of tea to 
pluck, and as the laborers obtain some extra wages when they have 
harvested extra weight, they will often discipline themselves to earn a bit 
more income. 
If we consider the staff, authority lies clearly in the planter’s hands. 
According to my informants, he takes all the important decisions and 
other members of staff have only a managing role. Thus, during staff 
meetings, which took place in the administrative building hall, the 
foremen would sit on the side on some benches while ordinary staff 
members sat on their bottoms in the rear of the hall, while the general 
director and the planter sat at a desk in the middle. But the planter had a 
much better-looking chair and the most central position. The scene 
resembled a king’s council, with the planter/king in the middle with his 
chancellor to one side, the ministers behind him, and his court in front. At 
least, this is how popular Hindi TV shows represent it. 
A colorful character, the planter looks like he had just come off a TV 
screen―but from another type of show, a nostalgic and extremely popular 
series about the colonial era. With his khaki jacket and shorts, his hat 
(though not the colonial pith helmet) and his horse, which he loves to ride 
when touring the plantation, he is indeed the perfect incarnation of a 
gentleman farmer. He has studied in the UK, and loves to bring the 
tourists (or importers) to his cottage, inviting them in with a charming 
British accent. He then feeds them with stories about his family and his 
own achievements, along with some biodynamically-produced miso 
soup.8 Not only does this planter, with a Bengali background,9 obtain 
                                                        
8 The miso soup is made from vegetables needing a lot of water to grow, even  
though workers’ villages experience a huge scarcity of water. 
9 Although it been established in the plantation, the family’s roots are in Kolkata. 
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symbolic status with this image; he is also a Brahmin, and his nickname 
means “king.” So he could hardly carry with him more symbols of power: 
the colonial administrator and the king of his domain, belonging 
furthermore to the higher caste status. So his stature of absolute power 
obviously contradicts the vision he would like to promote as simple 
manager of a community for which, as stated in the internet site (while 
explaining why the tea estate is fair and ethical, and using the “we” 
pronoun): “We sustain the right of the community for health, housing, 
education, but also to decide on its future with self-confidence and 
sovereignty”―guided by the mantra of “partnership, not ownership.” Nor 
does it make credible his personal discourse when he sometimes calls 
himself a “small farmer” in front of the tourists. He indeed owns not only 
half the hill where his forests and tea bushes grow, but also (as in any 
plantation) the very soil upon which all the inhabitants’ houses are built. 
His omnipresence is also perceptible in the laborers’ discourse since he 
features in almost every single one of their conversations. The workers 
can express their attachment, their disgust, their recognition through 
their anger, but, however they do so, the planter remains central. When 
referring to the authority inside the plantation, the workers almost never 
talk about the managers, directors, or other staff, but about him directly. 
His decisions seldom encounter resistance, even though breaches in 
workers’ rights are numerous. 
 
Breaches in social standards 
Surprisingly, for a plantation which claims to engage itself in favor of 
workers’ rights, their empowerment, and community management―in 
other words, which claims  to do more than what is compulsory―there 
are a number of breaches in mandatory labor rights as outlined in Indian 
law. In addition, the premium provided by the sale of Fair Trade products 
should in theory be reinvested in “community projects” (Nichols and Opal 
2005). The organization in charge of deciding how the income is to be re-
invested into such projects is called the Joint Body. It is thus a compulsory 
element for any enterprise wishing to export goods labeled “fair trade.” 
When Fair Trade actors were still dealing only with cooperatives, the 
Joint Body was the council of each cooperative’s members. Their goal was 
to decide democratically where people who own their means of 
production should reinvest their surplus income (ibid.). 
Since plantations like the one under discussion are now labeled 
“fair trade,” the Joint Body is made up of workers’ representatives, but 
how are these representatives chosen? This is not openly made clear by 
those concerned.  Interestingly, the plantation’s website does make a 
reference to the “Joint Body” which is now (although this was not the case 
at the time of my fieldwork) described as a continuation of the village’s 
elder councils, which managed to handle “for over a century the wellbeing 
of their respective villages.” The management is then presented as an 
institution which is approached for help when an issue is beyond the Joint 
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Body’s control. In the plantation, as Besky already noted, the Joint Body 
has only a representative role, mainly for the benefit of tourists, NGO 
representatives, and customers who ask to meet it. I was told during my 
fieldwork that the last Joint Body meeting had been held three years 
previously. Similarly, when Sarah Besky arrived some years before me, 
she was also told that the Joint Body had not met for months (2008). 
Hence, there is no clear evidence that the Joint Body has ever met in any 
other form than a decorative one. For example, during my stay, a fake 
meeting was held for visiting Swedish students. This was more an 
interview, during which the translator was obliged to invent a discourse 
when the Joint Body members―mainly women, because the plantation 
pretends to act for gender emancipation―were asking themselves what 
they should say to these foreigners. They had received no orders from the 
planter and feared his reaction if they said anything wrong. The questions 
about money which were raised by the students had to be avoided, and 
for advice they turned to the General Director. 
This is not to say that no community projects exist. They do, but 
except when―as we will see later―they are implemented by tourists or 
foreigners, it is the planter who is the president of this Joint 
Body―normally a consultative position―and, according to all my 
informants, he is the one who takes all the decisions, sometimes alongside 
his staff. An old Joint Body member, who can be seen on the internet site 
as a “the sole member of the NAP-Council of Fairtrade Labelling 
Organisation, who has carved a niche for herself in the annals of Fair 
Trade international representation for all Tea Estates lady workers 
globally,” told me quite directly that they had no autonomy, although she 
had defended some proposals, for micro loans for example, that had been 
successful. But, again, other informants told me that it was generally the 
planter who decided which personnel could and could not obtain loans. 
The proposals she was talking about were old ones from the 1990s, when, 
according to my informants, the Fair Trade system was functioning in a 
much better way. 
At the time of my fieldwork, there were also breaches in the 
application of compulsory labor rights, this is to say, of the laws that all 
plantations―“fair trade” or not―should uphold. Being a part of the 
Organized (labor) Sector, the tea plantation workers are part of the tiny 
minority of laborers (seven per cent, according to Lerche 2012) who are 
protected by Indian labor laws, especially by the Plantation Labor Act of 
1951. The first and the most notable of the rights provided by this act is 
that it is practically impossible to dismiss a worker, who is also 
sometimes allowed to bequeath his job to his son at the time of his 
retirement. This right was broadly respected on the plantation. Workers 
have a minimum wage (which also exists in the unorganized sector) and 
diverse allowances: for example, the right to have their houses repaired 
free of charge (since the planter owned them), the refunding of medical 
expenses, help for children’s schooling, and some basic living materials.  
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Although Besky (2008) noted that the daily wage was slightly 
below the minimum at the time of her fieldwork, during my own research 
the company was respecting the minimum wage. Medical expenses were 
sometimes refunded, usually after several years of delay, but sometimes 
not at all. It was somehow ironic that one of the main activities of the 
tourists was to participate in the health care volunteer program, on a 
plantation where the company should have been making donations for 
healthcare―at least, for all those in the plantation labor force. The repair 
of houses was erratic, and often carried out by the tourists themselves, 
who paid around fifteen euros a day for their stay, and who purchased 
materials and contributed their labor to help the villagers repair their 
houses―this on a plantation where, except for the (rare) houses where no 
one worked inside the tea gardens, house repair should have been at the 
management’s expense. This situation tends to occur especially in a 
context where tea gardens’ minimum wages are extremely low, partly 
because all these allowances are calculated as part of those wages. Thus, 
when in 2010, I entered the Darjeeling planters club to obtain documents 
and explanations about minimum wages in the plantations, I was told that 
the remarkably low paid salary of Rs 6710 per day was such because the 
workers’ real wage when allowances were included was above Rs 200 per 
day.11 
The laborers, and the villagers in general, experienced an acute 
water scarcity problem, which stimulated their anger (as water provision 
is also compulsory according to the law on Plantation Labor Rights). It is 
true that this is not specific to the plantation and that it is an endemic 
issue throughout the Darjeeling district (Banerjee 2010), but it was 
especially severe inside the plantation. Thus, families from the plantation 
had to walk an average of 20 minutes every day in order to reach the 
springs, where they had to load around 30 liters of water per person in 
order to supply their household. One should keep in mind that this is a 
mountainous area, so that this task was particularly exhausting for them. 
                                                        
10 To compare: in my actual Bhopal fieldwork, where people worked in the 
informal sector, the daily wage for unskilled to skilled workers ranged from Rs 
50 to Rs 250/300, while extra-skilled workers could earn up to Rs 500/600 on 
heavy working days. But, at the same time, being part of the Organized Sector, the 
tea plantation workers were considered to be included in what Parry calls an 
“aristocracy of labor.” So one has to understand that, contrary to other sections of 
the Organized Sector where wages are significantly higher than in the informal 
sector (ibid.), their only advantage lies in the stability of their employment and 
their allowances. I do not make a conversion or rupees into euros or dollars 
because, although it is amusing to see that Rs 62 comes to less than two dollars a 
day, with Max Havelaar declaring that “1 billion people are earning less than 2 
dollars a day,” and that Fair Trade is meant to solve this kind of problem, such 
statements do not mean anything, except that they highlight the global 
repartition of capital because they are not linked with the local economy. In 
Darjeeling, if you earn the local minimum wage, and if you have a permanent job 
with your allowances properly given, you can live a somehow poor but pretty 
decent life compared to local standards. 
11 For example, when the “rental” price of the laborer’s house is taken into 
account. 
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The few waterworks that were constructed were built by tourists, 
especially by a British visitor who raised funds from the Rotary Club, and 
by an American couple who built a community center through the NGO 
CARE. Again, this means basically that these benefactors used to pay 
almost ten times the laborer’s wage in homestay in order to carry out at 
their own expense what the planter himself should have done. Almost half 
the sum was given back to the host family, the other half to the Joint Body 
(in other words, as stated earlier, to the company). This made hosting 
tourists a great opportunity for tea plantation inhabitants.  
All these breaches of the law are obviously not specific to this 
plantation. Failure to respect the Plantation Labor Act is common in the 
Darjeeling district (Sharma, 2000, 2003, 2005), and many informants 
stated that the situation on the plantation was acceptable, but not 
especially better than on any other plantation.12 Besky (2008) also came 
to the same conclusion. Therefore, the so-called corporate responsibility 
of the plantation is indeed a simple (and imperfect) respect of the law in 
terms of social benefits. We should not assume that the rights given to 
these workers by the owner reflect an effort to obtain Fair Trade 
certification, or are due to the kind of personal initiative presented on the 
internet site. The owner’s father was practically expelled from the 
plantation by his workers who, following mobilization in the late 1970s, 
established a union against his will and fought for their rights. The 
present planter had to manage a transition of power from father to son at 
a time of heavy social tension. It was under pressure from the first 
plantation union―a CITU trade union (Center of Indian Trade Unions) 
affiliated to the Communist Party of India (Marxist)13― that the main 
social improvements were made during the 1980s. Many workers were 
given permanent positions, before being later dismissed in the low 
production period―something which is now impossible, and which 
further explains the low rhythms I witnessed while doing fieldwork 
during the low season. Houses were improved, and the first school built 
on the plantation. Previously, the children had to walk an hour in order to 
attend school in the neighboring town of Kurseong. The 1980s saw 
fratricidal struggles between leftist and regionalist unions (affiliated with 
the Gorkha National Liberation Front, a party that advocated a separate 
Gorkhaland state). According to my informants, this conflict deeply 
compromised the relationships between trade unions in all plantations in 
the district. Shooting incidents between communists and regionalist trade 
union members are said to have occurred. The planter’s French importer 
                                                        
12 They made this estimation based on what they were told by their family 
members and friends on the neighboring plantations. The unionists also made 
use of their trade union network to form judgements. 
13 The Communist Party of India (Marxist), founded in 1964, was born from a 
schism with the Communist Party of India and is one on the main leftist parties in 
India. It used to be extremely powerful in West Bengal, and kept power there for 
more than 30 years (1977-2011) before being wiped out by Mamata Banerjee’s 
Trinamool Congress.  
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friend explained to me that during this period, he used always to walk 
around the plantation carrying a loaded gun. It thus appears that from 
both the planter’s as well as the workers’ perspectives, this period was 
one of considerable tension, approaching some kind of collective trauma. 
Following this, the introduction of Fair Trade and several 
revelations concerning corruption scandals involving trade unionists,14 
the involvement of workers in union militancy decreased inside the 
plantation. Today, the only remaining union had only 50 members in 
2010 and seldom received support from the workers. Many believe that 
union members, some of whom evolved from being leftists to regionalists, 
are active only for the advantages that their position can give them vis-à-
vis the company and that, during negotiations with the staff, they will call 
on the planter to conclude a friendly agreement. Today, people often 
prefer to approach the planter or other staff members directly when they 
want to get a loan or to raise an issue of some sort. The last noticeable 
victory by the union was over the issue of Nepalization of the workers in 
the 1990s, when staff positions, previously allocated only to Bengalis, 
were partly opened up to people of Nepalese origin, born on the 
plantation. The only other issue that the union had recently 
negotiated―putting aside the continuous pressure to maintain wages 
following the regular raise of the minimum wage―has been the 
rehabilitation of houses following the cyclone in 2009 and some more 
recent landslides. 
It would be tempting to postulate a link between the decline of the 
unions, the end of the Soviet Union, and India’s entry into an era of 
globalization through the liberalization of its economy―all of which 
occurred in 1991. But we should not draw such a conclusion before 
understanding the particularities of Indian labor conditions, which, 
according to Rohini Hensman (2011), have little to do with globalization 
as such, being more aggravated by neoliberalism rather than caused by it. 
This means that one should be cautious before linking a case study 
presenting poor labor conditions and low trust in trade unions to recent 
changes at international and national levels. For example, the Communist 
Party stayed in power until 2011 in West Bengal, twenty years after the 
decline of the communist unions in the Darjeeling district, a situation that 
seems to have been caused more by an inability of the communists to 
address regionalist claims than by anything else.  
Another point has to be made about the unions. I agree with Besky 
(2008) when she concludes that Fair Trade institutions, though they 
pretend the opposite, are acting in this case as neoliberal institutions 
competing against and threatening to erode the state-driven unions and 
legal institutions, which were already protecting the workers quite well 
on this plantation. I have every reason to believe that this might be the 
                                                        
14 For example, two scandals involved the union, as well as the planter, when 
funds from NGOs for villages’ water connections were embezzled. 
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case throughout the Darjeeling district. Fair Trade was seen by 
Darjeeling’s planters as a way to expand their market and gain more 
flexibility with labor issues, being able to cut corners on labor laws 
without losing their certification (ibid.). In this sense, the link between 
Fair Trade and neoliberalism seems quite obvious. We have seen that in 
this plantation, the Fair Trade institutions allow the planter to market his 
product as a socially responsible tea, as he respects a law that would 
never have been respected without the trade union movement,. However, 
these institutions do not seem keen to support any efficient institution 
representing the labor force’s interests (as we have seen with the Joint 
Body’s inactivity). It is also important to stress the high level of 
corruption that sometimes occurs within the unions, including the union 
on this plantation. Such corruption has contributed to their loss of 
credibility much more rapidly than the creation of Fair Trade institutions. 
Of course, Besky (2010) says that people are nostalgic for the old welfare 
model and even the colonial times, which they view―not necessarily 
correctly―as an era with less corruption. I myself suspect that the 
nostalgia of the Darjeeling inhabitants is a fictive representation of a 
Golden Age, to help them deal with the trauma of bloody political rivalries 
of the 1980s, and may well be exaggerated. This may also be true of the 
discourses I collected about the early days of the union.  
Corruption within Indian unions is hardly new and has probably no 
link with neoliberal policies or globalization. Based on his fieldwork in the 
nationalized coal mines of Dhanbad in the early 1980s, Heuzé (1987) 
stated that the miners did not trust their unions because they saw them 
as dishonest and clientelist. Miners sought union assistance only because 
they could obtain some sort of personal benefit for themselves or family 
members from the union. These workers, as Marxists, also operated 
under the illusion of a Golden Age embedded in a nostalgia for a 
fantasized village economy (ibid.). Moreover, the discourse centered on 
the recent upsurge in corruption is popular in other parts of India and 
may be exaggerated (Parry 2000).  
Having dealt with these controversial points, let us now come back 
to the figure of the planter and try to understand how he was able to 
regenerate an old governance system through the use of clientelist 
relationships with his workers. 
 
A management system regenerating an old clientelist structure 
Prior to the creation of the trade union, the planter’s father ran the 
plantation paternalistically, in a manner described by Chatterjee (2001): 
the planter had to represent a strong authority, with a bit of benevolence 
(the plantation already had a dispensary at that time), so as to be both 
strict and just. Thus, an old retired worker told me that he was nostalgic 
for the era of the planter’s father, when the workers were “innocents” 
(that is, not yet inspired by Marxist ideologies) and when governance was 
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“fair” (it did not encourage shirking activities through a too lax position). 
There was also good social mobility at that time. A man started as a 
teenage tea plucker and ended his career in a good supervisor position. 
This kind of governance is characterized as a patronage15 system by 
Chatterjee (ibid.), a relationship that presupposes obedience and 
deference on the part of a worker, and a mix of coercion, sense of justice, 
and even protection on that of the owner. This image derives from images 
of the colonial administrator and the Mughal Empire landlord called a 
zamindar.16 The planter was often called the Maa-Baap,17 the father-
mother figure or supreme authority. The planter based his authority on 
coercion (the father’s side), but he was also a protective figure (the 
maternal side), which allowed him to convince his workers that he wishes 
them well. This governance system, applied by the current plantation 
owner, has obtained an implicit charter of values, an ethos of the 
dominant. It is also impossible to deny that the current planter allowed 
for significant social progress on his plantation, especially compared to 
the administration of his father. He agreed to negotiate with the unions, to 
implement social protection, to regularize the status of almost all the 
workers as permanently employed, and to implement some “community 
development” projects, although many of these failed or were started by 
external actors. Finally, he opened up staff positions to the locals. 
Nevertheless, the governance system has remained the same in 
essence. Thus, the female member of the Joint Body mentioned earlier 
referred to the planter as “their mother and father.”  In this sense, the 
owner stays completely within the Maa-Baap image: he is ostensibly 
distant from his employees, obliging them to salute him military-style 
whenever he visits the plantation―an act which could hardly be clearer 
                                                        
15 This kind of relationship, as we will later see, should not be totally confused 
with paternalism. Rather, it is a specific form of patron/client relationships 
which, even today, frame a large number of hierarchical relationships in India: 
for example in political parties (Rudolf 1998), pre-independence village life 
(Dumont 1969; Breman 1996), and even the structure of unions (Ramaswamy 
1983; Chatterjee 2001). It was present even more in pre-revolutionary Nepal 
(Ramirez 2000). So this kind of relationship is a general pattern that exists in 
diverse forms, embedding distinct realities. 
16 The zamindars were the local landlords of the Mughal Empire, consisting 
broadly of a class of petty or medium countryside nobility often coming from the 
lineages of village chiefs. They were used by the empire as intermediaries to 
collect the huge amount of land taxes fueling the Mughal war machine. Their 
power was conserved during British dominion, when administrators somehow 
imitated the domination system of the zamindars, particularly in how they also 
(partly) established their control over land revenues, thereby including 
themselves in indigenous domination structures.  
17The Maa-Baap figure in an evocation of colonial power. As a patronage system, 
it has multiple forms―referring to the State as a protective entity, or to the 
colonial administrator himself. Here, it is a reference to the figure of the 
administrator: the first planters, who were British, were like the administrators 
of their domains. In many plantations, the situation has evolved socially, of 
course, but little has changed concerning the nature of this power relationship 
(Chatterjee 2001; Sharma, 2000). 
Journal of Business Anthropology, Special Issue 3, Spring 2016 
 
 
34 
concerning the weight of the colonial legacy. He can be very harsh with 
his workers at times, and acts as their benefactor only if they also exhibit 
the required amount of deference and obedience. The owner’s protection 
is thus quite different from positive labor rights since obtaining any sort 
of material or social benefit is always seen as a favor. Workers who have 
the most difficulties obtaining their refunds are generally those who did 
not act deferentially enough when requesting these refunds from the 
planter, or who are part of the trade union and do not accept his 
overtures of co-optation. The micro loans, so much advertised on the 
company’s Internet site, are not given by the Joint Body, but have to be 
requested directly from the general director or the planter. The union is 
also trying to pressurize the staff in order to obtain more loans, but when 
it comes to health benefits, the workers often prefer to ask for these 
themselves, thus developing a personal―and, of course, very 
unequal―relationship of dependence with the planter. Workers who are 
not docile fear the planter, and there are many rumors about “traitors” 
and “spies” (generally those who have obtained larger loans, time 
benefits, or the opportunity to host tourists) who are said to report any 
subversive statement to the planter. To what extent this is true I do not 
know for sure, but during fieldwork, the planter consistently 
demonstrated to me that he was well-informed of my progress and of my 
(potentially subversive) “findings.”18 
The practice of granting loans is by no means a contemporary social 
measure implemented by Fair Trade actors and NGOs. The loans may 
have a new name―“micro loans”―but, in fact, granting one-off loans for 
weddings, funerals, or to buy some drinks has been a very old practice 
among the colonial planters, and was originally used to tie the workers to 
the plantation when money-lenders’ interest rates were exorbitant and 
debts almost impossible to repay (Engels [in Robb 1993]; Xaxa 1997; 
Bhowmick 1981; Chausuri 1995; Chatterjee 2001). This system was not 
specific to tea plantations, and in the whole of rural India loans made by 
the dominant class are still used to acquire land and sometimes to put the 
dominated groups into bonded labor positions (Breman 1974, 1985; 
Heuzé 1989; Picherit 2009). Therefore, the use of micro loans to 
perpetuate an old practice of moneylending is not specific to this 
fieldwork or to the tea plantations. Picherit (2009) observes how in 
Andra Pradesh (now Telangana), the Reddys, a cast of landowners, 
middlemen and moneylenders, have managed to acquire a monopoly on 
the micro loans officially attributed to them, thus giving formal borrower 
status to people who already owe them informal loans. The planter does 
not bond anyone by the debt because the interest he demands, around 
three per cent, is more than reasonable compared to the interest rates in 
the informal moneylender system (where rates for informal loans can 
                                                        
18 Therefore I must thank him for not having expelled me from his plantation 
when he knew very well that my survey had come to reveal information that 
could be harmful to his company’s image.  
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easily be as much as 30 per cent). Still, as the loans are not granted on 
formal, democratic terms, but by a unilateral act of benevolence, the 
planter’s micro loan arrangement reproduces this patronage system, in a 
somehow more benign way. This could be interpreted as paternalism, but 
it should be linked with an older colonial and indigenous genealogy of 
Indian modes of domination.  
Interestingly, the planter now assumes this genealogy, and states 
on the plantation’s home page (though presenting these characteristics as 
the management’s): 
The management―since its inception in 1859―has always done its 
best to augment or resolve a crisis that threatened the harmonious 
functionality of the community. This bond had always been the 
cornerstone for the bonding between the generations of the 
Chatterjees19 and the resident working community.  
While this mode of governance certainly contradicts claims by the 
company to work for the empowerment, social rights, and self-
determination of the community, it does not necessarily contradict  the 
planter’s idea of a holistic community whose functionality he helps to 
keep intact in harmonious fashion. As I said, this mode of governance has 
some of its roots in indigenous patronage systems. Hence, these systems 
reproduce an ethos coming from the Hindu hierarchical ideology―an 
ideology which is precisely based on a holistic vision of society which, 
contrary to Fair Trade proponents and to Western modern ideology, 
consists of hierarchical and unequal relationships between its members. 
Western modernist conceptions envision a community formed of equal 
members, at least from an ontological point of view (Dumont 1967). For 
Dumont, the jajmani system, which ruled the economic exchanges and 
power relationships in the villages, came from that ideological 
framework. Although this point is controversial, it is difficult to deny that 
there is at least some reference to the ethos of the Hindu (Brahmanical) 
rank hierarchy in the way patronage relationships are shaped (Heuzé 
1987). It should be noted here that the planter and his family are 
Brahmins, which would make them particularly influenced by this 
Brahmanical ideology. From this point of view, there is not much 
contradiction between the Fair Trade conception of community-oriented 
welfare and management, the holistic conception of nature from the 
biodynamic agriculture, and the Brahmanical ideology.  What is missing 
from this equation, of course, is any notion of workers’ empowerment! 
If the planter has managed to reproduce a governance system 
against which his workers have in the past rebelled, it is probably because 
he has also managed to take back social issues from the union’s hands. 
For their part, a huge majority of the workers are resigned and cynical. 
They have no more confidence in the union leaders, or in the promises of 
Fair Trade. Some speak of the 1970s and1980s as a Golden Age for the 
                                                        
19 The family name has been changed. 
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union, with the beginning of Fair Trade certification. But, for many 
workers, hope for social justice vanished a long time ago. The majority are 
resigned to soliciting the benevolence of the planter, instead of defending 
their rights in some kind of labor struggle. This is not to say that they are 
unaware of the submission their attitude implies, or of the illegal nature 
of the situation: my interpretation is that, as with the corruption scandals 
and their internal struggles, the unions have failed to come up with an 
alternative vision. The workers feel that they hardly have a choice. 
Whenever I raised these issues, the response was invariably one of “What 
can we do?”  
As he regenerated his soil thanks to permaculture, the planter could 
also regenerate his paternalist patronage―partly because of the Fair 
Trade neoliberal institutions; partly because of the foreign tourists and 
benefactors who funded his system of targeted and somehow 
authoritarian benevolence. By taking on an ersatz ethical position vis-à-
vis the outside, mainly for marketing reasons, the planter was able to 
regenerate his own kind of ethical governance. But the ethics here is 
paternalist, based on the protection of the obedient worker in this system.  
The corporate social responsibilities within the plantation are not 
exactly what they are supposed to be when presented to the outside 
world. The workers, even those most frustrated by the planter’s 
governance over their lives, recognize that he is a good businessman who 
can maintain the plantation’s finances by profitably exporting his goods 
to the entire world. With the Fair Trade strategy, the planter thus 
performs his first obligation of protection: keeping the plantation and the 
workers’ jobs out of danger.  
 
Conclusion 
This model will probably soon come to an end. The owner recently sold 
his garden to a holding company, and he now owns only ten per cent of 
the shares. His sons will not take back the plantation, but he is still the 
general manager (Nyogi 2014). Having myself not returned to the 
plantation in six years, I do not know exactly how the decision to sell was 
taken by the planter, although there were rumors at the time of my 
fieldwork about his intention to do so. However, following the discussion 
above, I have every reason to believe that this paternalistic model would 
have survived a long time if the planter’s sons had taken over the estate. 
As we have seen, Fair Trade certification, with its neoliberal vision of the 
workers’ rights, probably helped the owner sell his tea at a higher profit, 
while providing him with a tool with which to deal with the social issues 
within the plantation in an old, clientelist planter’s way. It even enabled 
him to maintain some breaches in his application of the labor law.  
The planter’s adaptability was not the only factor behind his 
success, however. Divisions resulting from regional political evolution, 
and the unions’ involvement in corruption, led to the latter’s loss of 
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credibility. I would, however, be very cautious before concluding which 
factor is the more salient or if the two are linked. Nevertheless, we have 
described how an older system of governance, with roots in colonial and 
indigenous domination, was regenerated by internal modernization and 
CSR-friendly marketing which provided it with discretionary funds in the 
form of micro loans. We have seen how “traditional” modes of governance 
can be dramatically competitive and extremely resilient, even in a context 
where supposedly new corporate social responsibilities are promoted. 
Finally, it seem clear that the labeling organizations who supply this tea in 
the Western world by labelling it “Fair Trade” have, probably 
unintentionally, allowed for the marketing of more expensive tea while 
sacrificing workers’ empowerment. Fueling the system with the extra 
money collected, the plantation has benefited from the Fair Trade system, 
but undermined its workers’ ability to demand and receive more and 
better labor rights. But this is hardly surprising, given that the 
confrontation of Fair Trade ideals with local business ethics is essentially 
one of abstract ideologies, sometimes denounced as too abstract (Besky 
2008), with norms that are primarily pragmatic and functional (Gallenga 
2013). Business ethics, as we have seen, can be developed not in order to 
be “fair,” but rather to manage the workforce more efficiently. 
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